The Mora Rebellion resulted in a series of developments.  The Ottoman and Egyptian navies were destroyed at Narin.  Mehmet Ali Paşa, who had been assigned to supperss the rebellion, had suddenlyfound himself in a difficult situation.

              Russians were not alone in supporting the Greeks to carve out a Greek State from the territories of the Ottoman Emire.  Britain and France also had taken side with Russia.  They had destroyed the Ottoman Navy in alliance.  For Russia and the Big Powers of the West could conveniently form alliance against the Ottoman State as they scrambled of over the possessins the latter.

            Though expediencies occasionally dictated Britain and France to cooperate with Russia at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, nevertheless they had been concerned over Russia growing powerful enough to challenge their own interests.  Britain in particular was afraid lest the Czar’s forces should have access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and hence to the British possesions in the east, particularly India. The Ottoman State and Iran, how weak they may be at that juncture, were essential for Britain to keep Russia away from India. Britain, therefore, tried to maintain a certain degree of balance in the area. 

            Russia was aware of the vulnerability of the Ottoman State, with its navy destroyed. 

            Hence Czar Nicola ordered troop dispositions along the Ottoman Provinces of  Eflak and Buğdan¹ ,  Presented a Note to the Ottoman State on January 8, 1828, demanding independence for the Greeks, knowing well the it was unacceptable.  In fact the Czar was seeking a pretext to declare war against the Ottoman State. 

            The Russian Note was rejected.  War preparations were speeded up. 

            Russia was already at war in the east  with Iran over eastern Caucasia.  The Czar immediately turned an apostle of peace, and ended the hostilities by concluding a truce with the Shah of Iran at Turkmençayı.   And on April 26, 1828 he declared war against the Ottoman State.

            The Istanbul Government hoped that Britain and France would intervene to stop the Russian aggression. They, however, opted neutrality in the face of the intransigence of Czar Nicola to pressure the Ottoman Government to allow the Greeks secede from the empire. 

            The Ottoman State, after a two months delay, reluctantly decided to counter Russian aggression.
 

The Russians opened three fronts in the Balkans.  In the east, however, they were rather restrained.  Though they had sufficient force to attack the Forts Ahıska and Kars, the Russians preferred to wait.  They wanted to first handle the Forts of Anapa, Sohum and Poti along the Caucasian coasts of the Black Sea. 

            Immediately after the declaration of war, the Russian Navy blockaded the Caucasian coasts gainst any possible reinforcements of the Ottoman strongholds there. 

            Osman Paşa, the Commander of Fort Anapa, was informed of declaration of war not by Istanbul, rather by his agents in Taman.  The agents had detected military activities along the coast of Kerç.  The menace involved was promptly reported to the Paşa. 

            Osman Paşa was aware that the Russians were dominant in the Black Sea.  He, therefore, did not expect receiving reinforcements by sea. 

            There was just a few hundred strong military force at the fort.  The only force that he could depend on to defend against any Russian assault was the volunteers  that he hope the Caucasians might raise.

            Osman Paşa, while preparing for defense, informed the native leaders about the hostilities soon to start, and requisitioned support. 

            The developments took shape as foreseen by Pşımef.  The war had knocked at their door before they were prepared to receive it.  Nevertheless Pşımef himself had been busy throughout the Winter.  He had visited many a people; had insisted on holding a meeting, and on taking some urgent measures.  Including Şemız, most of the leaders  had thought he had been unnecessarily worried. 

            The message of the Fort Commander did not effect them much, either. They took it for granted that  the Sultan would anyway would send a navy and some troops; and it would not be hard to repel the invading Russians with the help of artillery batteries. 

            Geriyiko Ali was a reasonable person.  He justified Pşımef’s point of view.  Later Şemız too concurred.  Three of them together called on Indaryiko Mehmet to inform him of the approaching danger. 

            Mehmet Bey was the chief of the Çipako-Indar group of families.  He was highly regarded in the whole region.  He mobilized all the warriors of the coastal strip,  from Pşat to Tsemez. 

            In the neighborhood of Anapa, Zaniko Sefer, Havuduko Mansur and Şurukyiko Duğuj got busy with taking necessary measures to meet the war.  Soon afterwards the two groups merged together.  The leaders conferred at Sefer Bey’s farmhouse. 

            Bastiko Pşımef demanded that all the Adiğe forces be placed under a united command.  Several of the leaders objected the idea.  The objectors argued that concentration of the entire force at the Anapa front was a risky proposition; for the enemy could attack other areas as well. 

            The argument was off the point Pşımef had been trying to stress.  What he proposed was a unified command rather than concentrating the forces at a single front. 

            The Russian invasion, both on land and sea,  began in the middle of May.

            The Russian Navy commanded by Admiral Greig consisted of thirty vessels.  The larger ships had long range cannons on board. They had the capability of bombarding forts and towns on the coast. 

            The Russian marine force was commanded by Admiral Menchikov.  He had a four-thousand strong marine infantry force, equipped with rifles and bayonets. 

            Col. Profsky marched overland,  and took position to the north-east of Anapa.  The Russian army, included artillery batteries, rifle infantry units, and Cossack cavalry bands. 

            Their target was obvious.  No reinforcement was to be allowed to Fort Anapa by sea or by land. 

            The developments did not unfold as the Russians had expected.  Their fleet could not approach the coast due to storm, so the marines of Admiral Menchikov could not land. 

            The Adiğe forces commanded by Geriyiko Şemız and Havuduko Mansur pushed Col. Profsky’s forces back; but failed to wipe them out because of heavy artillery bombardment the enemy unleashed on the Adiğe volunteers. 

            Admiral Greig, in the meantime embarked up on a traditional Russian trick.  He sent some Armenian and Jewish traders, laden with precious gifts, to the Adiğe leaders. 

            The clever Russian handed a letter to be delivered to the Adiğe leaders. It  read as follows:

            -  We are at war, not with you,  but with the Turks.  We shall pull back once we throw the Turks out of Anapa.  We shall not allow a single Cossack pillagers to the southern territories cross the Kuban.

            The Russian emissaries had been selected from among the traders known to Havukudo Mansur and Zaniko Sefer, and  were frequent visitors to the Anapa Bazaar. 

            Zaniko had heard much about the Crimean events from his father.  The Russians had persuaded the Crimean khanzades²  to defect  by promises of independence for Crimea, which they never kept. Subsequently the Crimean Khanate was abolished, and the Peninsula was annexed to Russia. 

            Sefer Bey reminded the Crimean tragedy to the emissaries of the Russians.

            Şemız reacted more strongly than Sefer Bay.  He roared,

            -  Be careful.  Never again come to us with such absurd suggestions.  I would not feel pity  chopping off  your heads!

            The Russian Admiral was nervous at his conspiracy being frustrated.  He tried a more effective method. 

            He ordered a few light frigates to sail on to Tsemez and Gelincik waters.  The light vessels entered to quays and bombarded the settlements on the Coast. 

            Some of the Adiğe leaders, including Indaryiko Mehmet and his son Nogay, Geriyiko Şemız,  and Bastiko Pşımef  rushed to the Coast along with their men to defend their homes and families.

            The situation had indeed assumed  dangerous dimensions.  Had the Russians been bold enough to attempt a landing, they would have faced with little resistance. 

            Admiral Greig, having thus divided the Adiğe Forces, landed troops on the Anapa coast.  The landing forces was accompanied by batteries of light artillery. 

            Anapa was heavily bombarded from sea as well as from the beaches.  In the meantime the Cossack cavalry and marine infantry with rifles and bayonets  covered the artillery from the rear, and tried to keep the Adiğe volunteers off the battle field. 

            The Russian commanders had estimated that the defense of Fort Anapa would hardly last for three days.   It proved a wishful thinking.  Notwithstanding the fact that the guns at the fort were out-worn-out and the strength of trained soldiers in fort wasmuch below the required level,  defense was sustained for several days.

            The Adiğe leaders such as Havuduko Mansur, Şurukyiko Duğuj, Kalabatuko Hatuk, Daziyiko Supaş and Kass Demir and the volunteers under their command seriously harassed the Russians.  unable as they had been to directly confront the enemy artillery and the riffled infantry,  they launched night assaults.  They effectively supported the defense of Fort Anapa from outside.

            The Ottoman Navy had been destroyed in the Aegean Sea during the Mora Rebellion.  There existed a small Ottoman flotilla in the southern coast of the Black Sea. 

            Two freighters had been set sailing from Trabzon to Anapa with reinforcements on board, both troops and munition.   These were seized by the Russian warships at the coasts of Abhazya; and were later taken away to Crimea. 

            It was the  fortieth day of siege of Fort Anapa.  Two third of the five thousand men, women and children in the fort had been perished by then.

            Osman Paşa understood that defense could not be sustained with so a small force, with women and children included.  He accepted to surrender the fort on condition that the survivors be allowed to go to wherever they wanted. 

            The Russian commanders, notwithstanding expressed assurance of safe passage, treated and entire living inhabitants of the Fort as prisoners of war, and herded them to Crimea. 

            Then followed the siege of the Forts Sohum and Poti.  The latter Ottoman stronghold was defended by a three hundred strong force commanded by Arslan Bey. Though repelled several Russian assaults, he too finally had to  surrender. 

            Having captured all of the Ottoman forts  on the Caucasian coasts, the Russians moved on to Ahıska and Kars in full strength. 

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            After capturing Ahıska and Kars, the Russians slowed down their pace of further expansion at the eastern front.   At the western front, however, the Russian forces had advanced down to Edirne, in the meantime. 

            The Ottoman forces in the Balkans were in an awful condition.  The front had collapsed, and the unites had got lost contact with one another.  The Sultan had to yield under severe terms. 

            Representatives of the two belligerent states got together in Edirne, where they  singed a sixteen articles armistice. 

            Article four of the agreement stipulated annexation of the entire northern coastline of the Black Sea from the mouth of the River Kuban down to the Georgian port of Sanniko to the Russian empire. 

            The article thirteen of the agreement was interesting in that it provided the basis of the migrations that would last for many years to come.  To sum up, it stipulated  the following:

            “The two states, having established a flawless friendly relations between them, shall grant amnesty to all their respective subjects, without discrimination  in terms of their ethnicity, religion and gender; on account of their conduct and expressed loyalty in favor or against either of the signatory states in the course of the war, which is hereby terminated positively. ... Such persons may move out  from the Russian territories  to the Ottoman territories and vice versa, with their families and their movable properties.  They may dispose off their immovable properties within a period not exceeding eighteen months. ....”

            The article fourteen was on the status of prisoners of war.  It stipulated that “All prisoners held by the signatory states  shall be exchanged without any conditions attached  and any demand for indemnity, immediately upon ratification of the present agreement. 

            The Ottoman delegation at the armistice negotiations in Edirne, while ceding  whole of the Caucasian coastal area to Russia, neglected considering  the Adiğe peoples, who freely existed in the territories in question.  The Ottoman delegation had abandoned those territories to Russia, including the freedom and the destiny of the peoples living there. 

            Articles thirteen and fourteen, ostensibly carried humanitarian elements.  The persons involved were free to choose  where to stay.  In fact there were malicious designs beneath those kind words. 

            When Fort Anapa was under siege, its population was not comprised of the Turks only.  More than half of it were Caucasians.  Most of the two thousand persons taken from Anapa to Crimea as “prisoners of war “  happened to be Caucasians.  In the process of “exchange of prisoners”, pursuant to the terms agreement, they were dumped at the coasts of Anatoli, all of them, disregarding their being indigenous people of Caucasians.

            There was a great havoc in the Taman and Anapa area.  Most of the population there had escaped to the interior regions out of fear.  The rest of the population who could not take refuge anywhere else were trampled upon during the invasion.  Towns and villages were set on fire or  destroyed by bombardment, leaving thousands of the people homeless. 

            In the aftermath of the Russians having established a foothold in the coastal areas of Anap, exodus of the native Caucasians continued even in greater numbers due to persecution and insecurity.  They partly moved to the hinterland of Caucasia and partly migrated to Istanbul and to the coastal towns in Anatolia. 

            Although the articles thirteen and fourteen of the Armistice Agreement were to be implemented on voluntary bases; that is, only those who wished so were to be exchanged; the Russian military authorities implemented those clauses of the agreement as binding to all individuals they regarded as “prisoners of war”. 

            During the years 1829-1830 the port cities of Istanbul, Samsun, Sivas and Trabzon crowded with Tatar and Circassian refugees.  Homeless, starved and destitute refugee groups aimlessly wandered around in the area.  Many of them lost their dignity.  The slave traders were after them.  Women and children were sold in the bazaars.  Healthy young men were hired at farms and food-shops as manual servants.  A part of them were admitted to the armed forces.